On the Mathematics of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox by Villa, Cristiano & Walker, Stephen
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
04
09
8v
1 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
13
 M
ar 
20
15
On the Mathematics of the Jeffreys–Lindley Paradox
Cristiano Villa and Stephen Walker
School of Mathematics, Statistics and Actuarial Science - University of Kent
Division of Statistics and Scientific Computation - University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the well known Jeffreys–Lindley paradox. In a Bayesian set
up, the so-called paradox arises when a point null hypothesis is tested and an objective prior is
sought for the alternative hypothesis. In particular, the posterior for the null hypothesis tends
to one when the uncertainty, i.e. the variance, for the parameter value goes to infinity. We
argue that the appropriate way to deal with the paradox is to use simple mathematics, and
that any philosophical argument is to be regarded as irrelevant.
Some key words: Bayes factor, Bayesian hypothesis testing, Kullback–Leibler divergence, self-
information loss
1 Introduction
The literature on the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox has been prolific since it was brought to the attention
of objective Bayesians by Lindley (1957). Many authors have discussed this so-called paradox from
varying perspectives; including not only statisticians, but philosophers too. Our aim is to consider
the problem using simple mathematics.
Lindley (1957) shows that, for point null hypothesis testing, there may be a concern with the
objective Bayesian approach. In the specific example used, if the prior for the location parameter,
in the alternative model to the parameter being zero, has infinite variance, then the Bayesian
will always select the null model, regardless of the observed data. This was first suggested as a
warning against using improper priors, but the consequences have now become far reaching with
a substantial amount of literature written about the observation.
Let us describe the mathematical setting of the problem. Suppose we wish to test the hypothesis
H0 : θ = 0 vs H1 : θ 6= 0
for the normal model N(x|θ, 1). Let ρ0 = P (M0) be the prior probability assigned to the null
hypothesis and let pi(θ) = N(θ|0, σ2), for some σ > 0, be the prior distribution for the unknown
parameter θ under the alternative model.
Then the Bayes factor for this problem is given by
B01 =
N(x|0, 1)∫
N(x|θ, 1)pi(θ) dθ ,
1
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which represents the odds in favour of the null hypothesis with respect to the alternative. The
decision on whether one rejects H0 in favour of H1 is based on the posterior probability, given by
P (M0|x) =
[
1 +
1− P (M0)
P (M0)
1
B01
]
−1
.
This is the extent of the mathematical foundations to the problem. As Lindley noted, there are
some combinations of (ρ0, σ) yielding a P (M0|x) which one would not wish to countenance.
The natural objective choice for pi(θ) involves taking σ = ∞. However, rather than a direct
plug in of this value, a more general setting has been suggested and considered by Robert (1993)
which is to let ρ0 depend on σ, i.e. we have ρ0(σ), so then it is possible to study P (M0|x) as
σ → ∞. In this case we can identify three scenarios for P (M0|x) as σ → ∞, all of which have
associated problems. That is, there is no setting, i.e. choice of ρ0(σ), in which the choice σ = ∞
as an objective choice can work. What we mean by this is explained in Section 2. The conclusion
is that the objective idea of σ = ∞ does not work and consequently the message is not to use
it. On the other hand, we can set the pair (σ < ∞, ρ0(σ)) objectively using ideas of Type I error
calculations and a novel approach to the selection of priors for models.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we formalise the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox
and discuss Robert (1993) solution to it. Section 3 is dedicated to the our approach, and Section
4 is reserved to conclusions and final comments.
2 Formalisation of the paradox
In order to discuss approaches to the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox, let us first formalise it and, at the
same time, define the notation. The objective is to compare the two normal models,
M0 =
{
N(x|0, 1) = (2pi)−1/2 exp(−12x2)
}
,
M1 =
{
N(x|θ, 1) = (2pi)−1/2 exp{−12(x− θ)2}
}
.
To apply the Bayesian approach, as described in Section 1, we need to define both the priors; i.e.
the value of σ, for the unknown parameter θ, and the prior for the null hypothesis; i.e. the value
of ρ0. To be most general we will assume that ρ0 can depend on σ and hence we write it as ρ0(σ).
With this information we can compute the Bayes factor representing the odds of the null
hypothesis H0. That is
B01 =
N(x|0, 1)∫
N(x|θ, 1) ·N(θ|0, σ2) dθ =
e−
1
2x
2
e−
1
2x
2/(σ2+1)
√
σ2 + 1,
so the posterior probability for the null hypothesis is given by
P (H0|x) =
[
1 +
1− ρ0
ρ0
1
B01
]
−1
=

1 + 1− ρ0
ρ0
e−
1
2x
2/(σ2+1)
e−
1
2x
2
1√
σ2 + 1


−1
. (1)
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We note in (1) that the quantity
m(σ) =
1− ρ0(σ)
ρ0(σ)
1√
1 + σ2
is the key term and opens the way to understanding the paradox. We now assume the decision
maker wants to select σ =∞ in order to implement an objective Bayesian approach. To adequately
understand this procedure we argue the decision maker needs to specify m(σ) as σ → ∞, and to
this end we identify 3 important and exhaustive cases:
(i) m(σ) → 0. Under this scenario we have the undesirable result that P (H0|x) converges to
one regardless of the x value. This is the so-called paradoxical result. In fact, m(σ) → ∞
whenever for large σ we have, for any ε > 0,
1− ρ0(σ)
ρ0(σ)
1√
1 + σ2
< ε
i.e.
1− ρ0(σ)
ρ0(σ)
≤ ε
√
1 + σ2
ρ0(σ) ≥ 1
1 + ε
√
1 + σ2
.
So if the prior on the null hypothesis is too large as σ → ∞; i.e. σρ0(σ) → ∞, then the
posterior probability on the null hypothesis will converge to 1.
(ii) m(σ)→ c for some constant 0 < c <∞. Under this scenario it is that, for large σ,
ρ0(σ) =
1
1 + c
√
1 + σ2
≈ 1
1 + cσ
.
In particular, Robert (1993) presents an objective argument for
ρ0(σ) =
1
1 +
√
2piσ
.
However, this idea leads to an undesirable inconsistency in that ρ0(σ) → 0 yet P (M0|x) is
converging to a constant bounded away from 0. Thus, with σ =∞, we have P (M0) = 0 but
P (M0|x) 6= 0, which are incoherent choices.
(iii) m(σ) → ∞. Under this scenario we have that P (M0|x) → 0. This at least now becomes
consistent with the prior probability since ρ0(σ) → 0 in this case. Yet undesirable in that
with σ =∞, P (M0|x) = 0.
These considerations clearly exclude the choice σ =∞. It simply does not work. Thus a finite
choice of σ is required. In the next section we will demonstrate how we can set (σ < ∞, ρ0(σ))
objectively.
3 An objective choice for (σ, ρ0(σ))
Given a value of σ we first, in Section 3.1, show how to obtain an objective choice for ρ0(σ). Then,
in Section 3.2, we show how σ <∞ can be selected objectively.
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3.1 The prior ρ0(σ)
Our approach consists in measuring the worth of the alternative hypothesis with respect to the
null, as outlined in Villa and Walker (2014). In particular, we apply the well known asymptotic
Bayesian property that, if a model is misspecified, the posterior accumulates at the model which
the nearest, in terms of Kullback–Leibler divergence, to the true model (Berk , 1966). As such, the
divergence DKL(N(x|θ, 1)‖N(x|0, 1)) represents the loss we would incur if model M1 is removed
and it is true. Since we do not know θ, but we have the prior pi(θ), we can compute the expected
loss as ∫
Θ
DKL
(
N(x|θ, 1)‖N(x|0, 1)
)
pi(θ) dθ =
∫
1
2θ
2 pi(θ) dθ = 12σ
2. (2)
The model prior is determined by means of the self-information loss function (Merhav and Feder ,
1998), which represents the loss connected to a probability statement. For model M , the self-
information loss is given by − log P (M). Therefore, by equating the self-information with the
expected loss determined in (2), we have that the prior on the alternative model is
1− ρ0(σ) ∝ eσ2 .
Note that the prior for the null hypothesis is ρ0(σ) ∝ 1, and so we have
ρ0(σ) =
1
1 + exp{12σ2}
.
This then fits into category (iii) for large σ, which implies that P (M0|x, σ) goes to zero as P (M0)→
0. Thus there is coherence in this approach; however, we are not advocating the choice of large σ.
3.2 Determining σ
In any classical test the Type I error is of key importance. We can use this quantity to objectively
set the value for σ; if indeed the Type I error is an objective quantity, but nevertheless it needs to
be set, and a valid objective Bayesian criterion is to match classical benchmarks and quantities.
To determine an appropriate value for σ based on the classical concept of Type I error, we
would select σ so that
P0(reject H0) = α,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and P0 is the probability under the null hypothesis. Regardless of the surroundings,
all Bayesian experimenters in this problem would need to assign an αB value for which one would
reject H0 if P (M0|x) < αB. To have
P0
(
P (M0|x) < αB
)
= α, (3)
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Figure 1: Plot of logψ(σ), with αB = 0.05, for σ < 1.3. By setting σ = 1.2933 we ensure that
ψ(σ) > 0.
we require
1
1 +m(σ) exp
{
1
2x
2 σ2
1+σ2
} < αB,
i.e. exp
{
1
2
x2
σ2
1 + σ2
}
>
1/αB − 1
m(σ)
1
2
x2
σ2
1 + σ2
> log
(
α−1B − 1
m(σ)
)
x2 >
2(1 + σ2)
σ2
log
(
α−1B − 1
m(σ)
)
. (4)
Therefore, if we write
ψ(σ) =
2(1 + σ2)
σ2
log
(
α−1B − 1
m(σ)
)
,
we have (3) as
P0
(
x2 > ψ(σ)
)
= 2
[
1− Φ
(√
ψ(σ)
)]
= α. (5)
The key here is that ψ(σ) is decreasing as σ increases, so there is a one-to-one correspondence
between α and σ satisfying (5). Figure 1 shows the behaviour of logψ(σ), given αB = 0.05. As
it must be that ψ(σ) > 0, we compute logψ(σ) up to σ = 1.2930, which is the value that ensures
m(σ) < α−1B − 1, therefore, a positive ψ(σ).
Expression (5) has to be solved numerically. So, for example, if αB = α = 0.05, we would have
σ = 0.44. In other words, we can be objective about σ with a finite value. The notion therefore
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that an objective σ and σ =∞ is the only choice is wrong. An objective classical test requires an
α value and it is this which can be linked to the (finite) objective choice for σ.
4 Discussion
The findings of this paper can be summarised as follows. The posterior for the point null hypothesis
is driven by the quantity m(σ); in particular, if σ = ∞ is desired as an objective criterion then
the behaviour of m(σ) as σ → ∞ is the key. If the prior ρ0(σ) is fixed, e.g. is equal to 12 , then
the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox arises, since the posterior probability P (H0|x) goes to one. Robert
(1993) proposed to solve the issue by having m(σ) to converge to a positive constant. Although
the direct paradox is avoided, the approach gives an incoherent result as the posterior mass on
H0 is positive whereas the prior mass is zero. Our approach gives a quantity m(σ) which goes to
infinity, for σ going to infinity, which both solves the paradox and yields zero posterior mass for
H0 when ρ0(σ) = 0, implying the prior mass for H0 is zero.
It is clear that the three types of behaviour of m(σ) for large σ rule out the possibility of having
σ =∞. As such, σ has to be determined to have a finite value. For ρ0(σ), the choice can be either
objective or subjective. Our approach allows ρ0(σ) to be determined in an objective fashion by
considering the loss in information if the true model is removed. Dellaportas et al. (2012), on the
other hand, propose a prior for the null hypothesis that is subjective.
Dellaportas et al. (2012) focus on models for which the use of a multivariate normal prior is
appropriate, such as linear regression models, generalised linear models and standard time series
models. The idea is to set the multiplicative constant for the prior dispersion matrix, cm, which will
indicate the level of prior uncertainty. The authors aim to reduce the sensitivity of the posterior
model probabilities to the scale of the prior by suitably specifying the prior model probability.
This is done by setting
P (M) ∝ P ′(M)cdmM ,
where dM is the dimension of the model M and P
′(M) is a suitably determined base line prior
model probability. Dellaportas et al. (2012) recommend P ′(M) ∝ 1, although other choices are
possible. We see that the core of the whole approach is to make a prior model probability depen-
dent on the variance of the prior in the parameters, avoiding the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox.
The conclusion is that it is not possible to be objective for pi(θ) by setting σ = ∞. This is
not the sole case where objective Bayes fails to deliver adoptable solutions. For example, Jeffreys’
rule prior for multidimensional parameter spaces gives prior distribution with poor performance
properties (Bernardo and Smith , 1994). It is common practice not to use Jeffreys prior in these
type of problems and opt for a different solution, such as reference priors.
However, an objective and finite value of σ can be assigned by exploiting thinking behind
classical tests and setting the Type I error. That is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
σ and the Type I error α and it is this correspondence which permits the interpretation and
assignment of σ.
Surprisingly, or not, there have been philosophical papers attempting to find some hidden
profound explanation behind the paradox; see, for example, the recent papers of Spanos (2013)
and Sprenger (2013). We argue that it is not necessary to philosophize, as the mathematics of
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the problem are quite straightforward and a clear picture of what is happening can be understood
solely by mathematical considerations.
To discuss some of the philosophy, Spanos (2013) says: “The question that generally arises is
why the Bayesian and the likelihoodist approaches give rise to the above conflicting and confusing
results”. However, we have P (M0|x) < αB ⇔ x2 > ψ(σ), which is precisely the form of the classical
test !
The classical test is: reject H0 if x
2 > cα, where P0(x
2 > cα) = α. We can then set ψ(σ) = cα
to ensure a standard value for the Type I error. Consequently, Bayes makes no contribution to this
problem, since even a subjective Bayesian approach will yield a classical test, but with perhaps
a non-standard Type I error. Such an observation between Bayesian and classical tests has been
made by Shively and Walker (2013).
In short, both Bayesian and classical tests reject H0 if x
2 > c, and this is the obvious procedure
for testing H0 : θ = 0. How one determines c makes the difference, either via a Type I error, α, or
via a prior pi(θ), i.e. σ, but nevertheless there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two.
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